Abstract

Impact of Imperfect Information on the Optimal Exercise Strategy for Warrants

Koziol, Christian

In this paper, we determine the optimal exercise strategy for corporate warrants if investors suffer from imperfect information and we evaluate the impact of this friction on the value of a warrant. For this purpose, we address both exercises at maturity, where imperfect information about the firm value is present, and exercises before maturity which are impacted by imperfect information about the size of the dividend. We model imperfect information so that all warrant holders know that they obtain biased signals of the true state without observing the signals of other warrant holders. The optimal exercise strategy follows from a complex game among warrant holders in which every individual warrant holder must account for the potential signals of the other warrant holders and their resulting exercise decisions. The main findings are that due to imperfect information warrant holders optimally start to exercise their warrants later than without imperfect information. Moreover, a simple block exercise strategy is always an equilibrium strategy for a high degree of imperfect information before maturity, even though a partial exercise can be the unique strategy without imperfect information. Remarkably, imperfect information does not necessarily result in a lower warrant value. As long as a warrant holder has a signal that allows for correct exercise decisions, then imperfect information enhances the warrant value due to suboptimal exercises by other investors.
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